Consider a committee which must select one alternative from a set of three or more alternatives. Committee members each cast a ballot which the voting procedure counts. The voting procedure is strategy-proof if it always induces every committee member to cast a ballot revealing his preference. I prove three theorems. First, every strategy-proof voting procedure is dictatorial. Second, this paper's strategy-proofness condition for voting procedures corresponds to Arrow's rationality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, nonnegative response, and citizens' sovereignty conditions for social welfare functions. Third, Arrow's general possibility theorem is proven in a new manner.
INTR~OUOTI~N
Almost every participant in the formal deliberations of a committee realizes that situations may occur where he can manipulate the outcome of the committee's vote by misrepresenting his preferences. For example, a voter in choosing among a Democrat, a Republican, and a minor party candidate may decide to follow the "sophisticated strategy" of voting for his second choice, the Democrat, instead of his "sincere strategy" of voting for his first choice, the minor party candidate, because he thinks that a vote for the minor party candidate would be a wasted vote on a hopeless cause.l The fundamental question I ask in this paper is if a committee can eliminate use of sophisticated strategies among its members by constructing a voting procedure that is "strategy-proof" in the sense MARK ALLEN SATTERTHWAITE that under it no committee member will ever have an incentive to use a sophisticated strategy. I prove a negative answer: If a committee is choosing among at least three alternatives, then every strategy-proof voting procedure vests in one committee member absolute power over the committee's choice. In other words, every strategy-proof voting procedure is dictatorial. This result, which is reminescent of Arrow's general possibility theorem for social welfare functions [l] , suggests a second question. What is the relationship between the requirement for voting procedures of strategyproofness and Arrow's requirements [I] for social welfare functions of rationality, nonnegative response, citizens' sovereignty, and independence of irrelevant alternatives? I show that they are equivalent: a one-to-one correspondence exists between every strategy-proof voting procedure and every social welfare function satisfying Arrow's four requirements. This means that if a social welfare function violates any one of Arrow's requirements, then the voting procedure which is naturally derived from the social welfare function is not strategy-proof. Last, for the third result of the paper,Iuse the first two results to construct a new proof of Arrow's general possibility theorem.
The questions of this paper are not new. Black [2, p. 1821 quotes the vexed retort, "My scheme is only intended for honest men!", which Jean-Charles de Borda, the eighteenth century voting theorist, made when a colleague pointed out how easily his Borda count can be manipulated by sophisticated strategies. More recently Arrow [ 1, p. 71 suggested that strategy-proofness is an appropriate criterion for evaluating voting procedures. Dummet andFarquharson [3] conjectured in passing thatfor the case of three or more alternatives no nondictatorial strategy-proof voting procedure exists. By means of distinctly different techniques Gibbard [7] and Satterthwaite [ 131 independently formalized and proved this conjecture. 2 In addition Zeckhauser [19] proved a similar existence theorem. Vickery [IS] and Gibbard [7] speculated about, but did not definitively establish the relationship between strategy-proofness and Arrow's four requirements. Finally, Farquharson [4] , Sen [16, pp. 193-1941 , andpattanik [9-l 11 each commented on different aspects of the manipulability of nondictatorial voting procedures. This paper has six sections. In Section 2 I formulate the problem and z In my doctoral dissertation [13] I stated Theorem 1 (existence of a strategy proof voting procedure) and proved it using the constructive proof presented in Section 3 of this paper. This work was done independently of Gibbard. Subsequently, an anonymous referee informed me of Gibbard's paper. The statement and proof in Section 4 of Theorem 2 (correspondence of strategy proofness and Arrow's conditions) followed directly from the insight which I gained from reading Gibbard's paper. establish notation. The next three sections contain in sequence the paper's three results: strategy-proof voting procedures are necessarily dictatorial; a one-to-one correspondence exists between strategy-proof voting procedures and social welfare functions satisfying rationality, nonnegative response, citizens' sovereignty, and independence of irrelevant alternatives; and construction of a new proof of Arrow's general possibility theorem using the first two results. In order to clarify the exposition of these three sections I have made within them the restrictive assumption that indifference is inadmissable. In Section 6 I eliminate this assumption and show how each of the results extend to the general case where indifference between alternatives is admissable.
FORMULATION
Let a committee be a set 1, of n, n 3 1, individuals whose task is to select a single alternative from an alternative set S, of m elements, m 2 3. Each individual i E I,, has preferences Ri which are a weak order on S,,, , i.e., Iii is reflexive, complete, and transitive.3 Thus, if X, y E S, and i E I, , then xRi y means that individual i either prefers that the committee choose alternative x instead of y or is indifferent concerning which of the two alternatives the committee chooses. Strict preference for x over y on the part of individual i is written as x&y. Thus, xKi y is equivalent to writing xRi y and -yRix. Indifference is written as XRi y and YRiX. Let rr,,, represent the collection of all possible preferences and let v,* represent the n-fold Cartesian product of rr, .
The committee makes its selection of a single alternative by voting. Each individual i E Z, casts a ballot Bi which is a weak order on S, , i.e., BiE?rm. The ballots are counted by a voting procedure vnm. Formally, a voting procedure is a singlevalued mapping whose argument is the ballot set B = (B, ,..., B,J GUT,* and whose image is the committee's choice, a single alternative x E S, . Every voting procedure vnm has a domain of rmn and a range of either S, or some nonempty subset of S, . Let the range be labeled T, where p, 1 < p < m, is the number of elements contained in T,, . Given these definitions, let the tetrad (I, , S, , vnnz, T,> be called the committee's structure.
This formulation of the committee decision problem incorporates two assumptions which particularly merit further comment. First, the committee makes only a single decision. This assumption excludes from With the basic structure of the committee specified, I can define the concept of a strategy-proof voting procedure. Consider a committee with structure <I, , S, , Pm, T,). Individual i E 1, can manipulate the voting procedure vnm at ballot set B = (Bl ,..., B,) ~7," if and only if a ballot Bi' E r, exists such that unm(B1 ,..., Bi' ,..., B,) &Wm(B1 ,..., Bi ,..., B,).
(
Thus, vnln is manipulable at B if an individual i E 1, can substitute ballot Bit for Bi and secure a more favorable outcome by the standards of the original ballot Bi . The voting procedure u nm is strategy-proof if and only if no B E n," exists at which it is manipulable. 5 This definition has two interpretations. If a voting procedure unrn is not strategy-proof, then a ballot set B = (Bl ,..., Bi ,..., B,) e7rmn and ballot B,' E ~,,n exists such that vnm is manipulable at B. Suppose the ballot Bd faithfully represents the preferences of individual i in the specific sense that Bi E Ri . By substituting ballot Bi' for Bi individual i can improve the outcome of the vote according to his own preferences, i.e., v""(B, )...) Bit,..., B,) aivnm(B1 )..., Ri )...) B,).
The ballot Bi 3 Ri is the individual's sincere strategy and the ballot Bi # Ri is a sophisticated strategy.
4 Set valued decision functions can give unambiguous choices if they are coupled with a lottery mechanism that randomly selects one alternative from among any sets of tied alternatives. This is the approach which Fishburn [6] and Zeckhauser [19] adopted. I reject this approach here because I think that the use of decision mechanisms with a random element would be politically unacceptable to almost all committees. Gibbard [7] argued in detail in favor of this paper's approach.
5 I have adapted this definition of strategy-proofness from Schmeidler and Sonnenschein [14] . My earlier definition in [13] is equivalent, but more awkward to use in proofs.
The second interpretation relates to the theory of games. If a voting procedure v nm is strategy-proof, then no situation can arise where an individual i E I, can improve the vote's outcome relative to his preferences Ri by employing a sophisticated strategy. Consequently, if vRnz is strategyproof, then every set of sincere strategies R = (R, ,..., R,,) E iriT,'" is an equilibrium as defined by Nash [8] . If the voting procedure is not strategyproof, then there must exist a set of sincere strategies R = (R, ,..., R,) E r,," which is not a Nash equilibrium.
Until this point I have defined the preferences and ballots of committee members to be weak orders over the alternative set. For the purpose of proof this is an inconvenient convention. Therefore, throughout a majority of this paper, I recognize as admissable preferences and ballots only strong orders. Let pm and pmn, respectively, label the set of strong orders over S, and the n-fold Cartesian product of pm . Since strong orders exclude the possibility of indifference, if x, y E S, , x # y, and Ri E pm , then xRi y implies x&y and -yRix. Similarly, if x, y E S, , x # y, and Bi E pm , then x&y implies x&y and -yB,x. Formally: RESTRICTION D. Consider a committee with structure (I,, , S, , vnm, T,>.
If this structure is subject to restriction D, then only preference sets R = (R, ,..., R,) E pmn and ballot sets B = (B, ,..., B,) E pm" are admissible.
A committee subject to Restriction D is called a strict committee and its voting procedure is called a strict voting procedure. For strict committees the definitions given above must be revised with the substitution of pmn for rrmn. Thus, a strict voting procedure vnm has a domain of pn" and is strategy-proof if and only if there exists no BE pm" at which it is manipulable.
My notational conventions for this paper are that the letters B, C, and D represent ballot sets or, if subscripted, individual ballots. The letters U, V, and W represent subsets of S, or T3 . The letters i and j index the individuals who are committee members and the letters w, X, y, and z represent elements of S, . Script upper case letters represent collections of voting procedures or social welfare functions. Finally, Y and 0 represent two functions which appear throughout the remainder of the paper.
The choice function YW , defined for any WC S, , is a mapping from 7r, into the nonempty subsets of S, . It has the property that x E Y,(B,) for some Bi 
EXISTENCE THEOREM FOR VOTING PROCEDURES
In this section I prove that if a strict voting procedure includes at least three elements in its range and is strategy-proof, then it is dictatorial. A dictatorial voting procedure, as its name implies, vests all power in one individual, the dictator, who determines the committee's choice by his choice of that element of the voting procedure's range which he ranks highest on his ballot. Formally, consider a voting procedure unrn with range T, . Define for all B E n," and for some i E I, the functionfri(B) so that it is singlevalued, has range T, , and iffri(B) = x then xBi y for all y E T, . The voting procedure vnm is dictatorial if and only if an i E I,, exists such that Pm(B) =fTi (B) for all B E Tag. Notice that fTi(B) is identical to the choice function Y'=(BJ except thatf#(B) has a tie-breaking property which the set valued !Pr(Bi) does not have.
Since I define dictatorial voting procedures with reference to its range T, , not with reference to the alternative set S, , two varieties of dictatorial voting procedures are possible. First, fully dictatorial voting procedures have as their ranges the full alternative set: T, = S, . Second, partially dictatoriaz voting procedures have as their ranges proper subsets of the full alternative set: T, C S, . In other words, if the voting procedure is partially dictatorial, then imposed on the dictator's power is the constraint that he can not pick any x E S, such that x $ T, .
The dictator of a dictatorial voting procedure never has any reason to misrepresent his preferences because the committee's choice is always that element of the range which the dictator ranks first on his ballot. The same is not necessarily true for other individuals. If at the top of his ballot the dictator states that he is indifferent among a group of several alternatives, then the dictatorial voting procedure may resolve the tie by consulting the ballots of the other individuals. If, for example, the Borda count is the method used to count the other individuals' ballots, then the manipulability of the Borda count when the choice is among at least three alternatives may give these individuals an opportunity to manipulate the outcome. Thus, when indifference among alternatives is admissable, dictatoriality is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for strategyproofness. It is necessary and sufficient when indifference is not admissable.
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Theorem 1 is the existence theorem for strict strategy-proof voting procedures. In Section 6 I extend it to the case of non-strict committees. This is formally a possibility theorem, but its substance is that of an impossibility theorem because no committee with democratic ideals will use a dictatorial voting procedure, Such a voting procedure vests all power in one individual, an unacceptable distribution.
The theorem limits itself to the interesting case where the voting procedure's range includes at least three alternatives. If its range contains less than three elements, then a trivial result is that two more types of strategy proof voting procedures exist: imposed procedures and twin alternative voting procedures.6 These two types are of little interest because committees usually must select among three or more alternatives.
An imposed voting procedure is one where no individual's ballot has any influence on the decision. Thus, a voting procedure is imposed if there exists a x ES, such that Pm(B) = x for all BE 7~~". Imposed voting procedures are strategy-proof because no individual's choice of strategyaffects the committee's choice.' Twin alternative voting procedures have ranges that are limited to only two elements of the alternative set. Formally, if a set T, = (x, y) C S, , x # y, exists such that v""(B) E T2 for all B E nmn, then vnm is a twin alternative voting procedure. An example of a strategy-proof twin alternative voting procedure for a committee considering the alternative set S, = (w, x, y, z) is defined by the rule: select alternative x or z depending on which is ranked higher on a majority of the committee members' ballots. Alternatives w and y are excluded no matter how the committee votes. This twin alternative voting procedure is strategy proof because each individual has only two choices: vote for or against his preferred alternative. Obviously, in this case, he has every reason to vote for his preferred alternative no matter what his subjective g Another class of strategy proof committee decision rules exist, but they do not satisfy our definition of a voting procedure because they involve a lottery. Let a lottery be held among the committee members' baIlots with each ballot having an equal opportunity of winning. The top ranked alternative on the winning ballot is then declared the committee's choice. This rule is strategy-proof, but its probabilistic nature would undoubtedly offend most committees. For a full discussion of lotteries as strategy-proof social choice mechanisms see Zeckhauser [19] .
' One may argue here that individuals have no incentive to play any strategy at all, whether sophisticated or sincere. Yet an imposed voting procedure is strategy-proof according to the definitions established above.
estimate of how the other individuals will vote is. Nevertheless, a twin alternative voting procedure is not necessarily strategy-proof because conceivably it might perversely count a vote for one included alternative as a vote for the other included alternative.
The proof presented here of Theorem 1 is by construction. I first show that the theorem is true for the case where n = 1 and m = 3. Next I prove that, where m = 3, if the theorem is true for any n = n', then it is true for I? = n' + 1. This sets up an inductive chain and therefore, in the m = 3 case, the theorem is true for all 12 2 1. Finally, given any arbitrary it 2 1, an inductive chain on m can be set up to establish the theorem's validity for m > 3. This proof is direct and is not based on Arrow's impossibility theorem. In both these respects it is different from Gibbard's proof [7] of this same theorem.
A necessary preliminary before beginning the proof's substance is to define weak and strong alternative-excluding voting procedures. A strict voting procedure vnm is weak alternative-excluding if and only if there exists at least one alternative x E S, such that vn"(B) # x for all B E pm". Thus, vnm is weak alternative-excluding if and only if T, C S, , i.e., its range must be strictly contained in S, .
The definition of strong alternative-excluding voting procedures depends on Condition U, a Pareto optimality condition. Less formally, if vnm satisfies Condition U and if the ballots unanimously rank x E T, higher than every other y E T, , then v*~ will select x as the committee's choice. Given this, a strict voting procedure vnm is a strong alternative-excluding voting procedure if and only if it is weak alternativeexcluding and also satisfies Condition U.
Condition U is helpful in the proofs that follow because every strict strategy-proof voting procedure must satisfy it. Lemma 1 establishes this assertion. LEMMA 1. Consider a strict committee (Z, , S, , vnm, T = T,) where n>l,m>3,andp>l.
Ifvnna is strategy-proof, then it satisfies Condition U.
Proof.
Suppose v nm is strategy-proof and does not satisfy Condition U. Consequently, for some x E T, there exists a ballot set C E pmn such that lu,(C,) = Y,(C,) = ... = u',(C,) and v""(C) = x # Yr(C,). Since where y E T, and y # Y=(C,). Let individual i have preferences Rs G C, . This means that Y,(C,) is that alternative contained within T, which individual i most prefers. Consequently, his best strategy is the sophisticated strategy Di rather than his sincere strategy C, , i.e. vnm is manipulable at (Dl ,..., Di-1, Ci 3 Ci+l y**-, C,). Therefore, if vnnz fails to satisfy Condition U, then it is not strategy-proof. 1
The next three lemmas prove that if a strict voting procedure vnJ defined for a three element alternative set is strategy-proof and has a range T, , 1 < p < 3, then it must be either fully dictatorial or strong alternative-excluding.
The main task of these lemmas is to show that if vnp3 is strategy-proof and T9 = S, , then vns3 is fully dictatorial. The result that if vns3 is strategy proof and T, C S3 , then vns3 is strong alternativeexcluding is secondary because it can be derived immediately. By definition T, C S, implies that v"*~ is weak alternative-excluding. Since vns3 is both strategy-proof and weak alternative-excluding, Lemma 1 implies that vns3 is necessarily strong alternative-excluding.
The method of proof which the three lemmas together employ is mathematical induction over n, the number of individuals who are committee members. Lemma 2 begins the inductive chain by proving the result for committees with a single member.
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ALLEN SATTERTHWAITE LEMMA 2. Consider a strict committee (II, S, , 9, T = T,> where 1 < p < 3. If v1s3 is strategy-proof, then it is either fully dictatorial or strong alternative-excluding.
Suppose the lemma is false. Therefore, a v1s3 exists that is strategy-proof and neither fully dictatorial nor strong alternativeexcluding. Then one of the following must be true: (a) vlJ satisfies Condition U and is not weak alternative-excluding, (b) v1s3 satisfies Condition U and is weak alternative-excluding, or (c) v1s3 does not satisfy Condition U. But Case (a) cannot be true since if T, = S, and if v1s3 satisfies Condition U, then v1*3 must be fully dictatorial. This conclusion follows directly because for a single member committee Condition U is equivalent to a dictatoriality requirement. Case (b) cannot be true because any weak alternative-excluding voting procedure that satisfies Condition U is strong alternative-excluding. Case (c) also cannot be true because Lemma 1 states that every strategy-proof strict voting procedure satisfies Condition U. 1
Statement and proof of Lemma 3 depends on the fact that we can write any strict voting procedure v"p3 as an n-dimensional table. For example, let (x y z) represent the ballot Bi with the properties that x Bi y, x &z, and y B+z where x, y, z E S, . Tables I and II are then equivalent representations of an arbitrary, asymmetric strict voting procedure v2s3. Specifically, if individuals one and two respectively cast ballots (x z y) and (y z x), then the committee's choice is z. Despite the if and only if phrasing, this lemma states that a necessary but not sufficient condition for constrcting a strategy-proof voting procedure v"+ls3 is that it be constructed out of a set of strategy-proof voting proce- 
dures Q3, k = l,..., 6. The condition is not sufficient because some sets of voting procedures vi*" exist such that individual n + 1 can manipulate the resulting voting procedure vn+ls3 in specific situations.
Suppose the necessary part is false. Therefore, a vn+lb3 with its set of constituent vl*" must exist such that (a) ZP+~*~ is strategy proof 
i.e., individual i can manipulate vet" at B. Substitution into (7) gives (8) 
which shows that t~+l,~ is manipulable at (B, B,,,). This contradicts the assumption that the lemma's necessary part is false. Suppose the sufficient part is false. Therefore a v"*ls3 with its set of constituent v;p3,..., Q3 must exist such that (a) v:'~,..., @a3 are strategy proof for all individuals j E I, and (b) IY+~*~ is not strategy proof for some individual i E I, . This implies that a ballot set (B, B,+l) = (Bl ,..., Bi ,..,, 4 
where (B', B,,,) = (B, ,..., Bi'y..., B, , B,+l). Assume without loss of generality that Bnfl = (X y z). Equations (8) and (9) hold and therefore vF*" may be substituted for zP+~*~ :
v;*~(B') &vns3(B). (12) Thus, 01"'~ is not strategy-proof, a contradiction of the assumption that the sufficient part is false. [ Lemma 4 starts with the assumption that every strategy-proof strict voting procedure v"s3 is either fully dictatorial or strong alternativeexcluding. Then, with Lemma 3 as justification, it uses Eq. (6) and those voting procedures that we assume to be strategy-proof to construct every strategy-proof strict voting procedure ~+l*~. The complication in this procedure is that a voting procedure v n+1*3 is not necessarily strategy-proof if it is constructed out of strategy-proof voting procedures Pan. Depending on precisely how vn+ls3 is constructed individual n + 1 may find that in specific situations he can manipulate @+ls3. LEMMA 4. Consider a strict committee <Ia+l, S, , vn+lv3, T,> where n 3 1 and 1 < p < 3. If every strategy-proof strict voting procedure vne3 is either fully dictatorial or strong alternative-excluding, then a necessary condition for n+1*3 v to be strategy-proof is that it be either fully dictatorial or strong alternative-excluding.
Let Y-m+1 be the collection of all strict voting procedures vn+ls3 for committees with n + 1 members. Let ?P+l C Vn+l be the collection of all strict voting procedures v n+1,3 E -tm+l that are fully dictatorial or strong alternative-excluding.
Let Vn and S" be the collections of strict voting procedures for committees with n members that correspond to Vn+l and 5P+l respectively. Let W n+l C -Im+l be the collection of all strict voting procedures ZJ"+~*~ E Vn+l that are constructed from voting procedures I.P.~ E ZP, i.e., v"*-~*~ E Wn+l if and only if ZP+~*~ can be written as where B = (Bl ,..., Bn) E pm" and vFP3 ,..., v:*~ E 2P. Finally let P* and Y",+l* be the collections of all strategy-proof strict voting procedures contained, respectively in the sets Vn and Vn+l.
Assume that Vcn* C 5?"^". Lemma 3 therefore implies V+l* C W"+l. Consequently, every v n+1*3 E Vn+l* can be identified by repeatedly partitioning Yfn+l and discarding at every step those subsets which are disjoint with Vn+l*. This partitioning of Wn+l depends on the fact that Xn contains seven classes of fully dictatorial and strong alternativeexcluding voting procedures: where T = S, and i E I,, (14) vns3(B) = h2'(B) = x,
v"*"(B) = h;3(B) = y, 
P3(B) = @3(B), (20) where the notation h>3 represents a strong alternative-excluding voting procedure with range U and where B E pmn, S, = (x, y, z), K = (x), L = (y). M = (z), iV = ( y, z), P = (x, z), and Q = (x, y). Type (14) clearly represents every possible fully dictatorial voting procedure for a committee with it members. Types (15) This procedure of elimination and partition may be continued through six levels until 17 subsets of W n+l are identied that are not disjoint with Yn+l*, i.e., these 17 subsets contain ?P+l*. For example, one of these subsets W&& contains a strategy-proof voting procedure of type /z:+'*~.
Inspection of these 17 subsets reveals that each one contains only strong alternative-excluding or fully dictatorial voting procedures. The specifics of this procedure are found in Satterthwaite [13] . Therefore Vn+l* = (Y-*+1* n ?v"+l) c Xa+l. 1 Lemma 4 establishes an inductive chain on n whose initial assumption is validated by Lemma 2. Consequently Lemmas 2 and 4 together prove that if a strict voting procedure nns3 is strategy-proof, then it is either fully dictatorial or strong alternative-excluding.
An inductive chain may also be established on m to generalize the results to any number of alternatives equal to or greater than three. I do not include the specifics of this step here because of their length; they may also be found in [13] . Lemma 5 summarizes this result. Two more steps are required to prove Theorem 1. Lemma 6 states that every strategy-proof strong alternative-excluding voting procedure must satisfy what is essentially an "independence of irrelevant alternatives" condition. The final step uses Lemma 6 to prove that every strategy-proof strong alternative-excluding voting procedure with a range of at least three alternatives must be partially dictatorial. This puts me in position to complete the proof of Theorem 1. It states that every strict voting procedure vnrn with a range of at least three elements is strategy-proof if and only if it is dictatorial. The if part is true by inspection. The only if part yields as follows. Lemma 5 states that if v"* is strategy-proof, then it is either fully dictatorial or strong alternativeexcluding Consequently, I need to show that if vnna is strategy-proof and strong alternative-excluding then it is partially dictatorial. Assume that v"" is strategy-proof, strong alternative-excluding and has a range T = T, , m>p23.
For all i E I, rewrite each ballot Bi E pm" as Bi* E pp" where Bi* is a strong ordering, defined over T, , with the property that Bi* = e,(Bi). Each Bi* is identical to Bi except that the m -p alternatives that are not included within the range of vnm are deleted. Consider any C E pm" and D E pm", C # D, such that F4-(CA..., f%(cJl = M~J,..., MaJl. 
Since vnna is strategy-proof, v fifl is also strategy-proof and, by Lemma 5, is either dictatorial or strong alternative-excluding.
It cannot be strong alternative-excluding because its range includes all p elements of TP . Therefore it is dictatorial: an i E I,, exists that for all B E pnLn v""m-u%),..., b@nN = .fwMBI),..., ww 
THE CORRESPONDENCE THEOREM
In this section I show that the strategy-proofness condition for voting procedures corresponds precisely to Arrow's rationality, nonnegative response, citizens' sovereignty, and independence of irrelevant alternatives conditions for social welfare functions. Briefly the section's substance is as follows. Initially I restate Arrow's definitions of social welfare functions, rationality, nonnegative response (NNR), citizens' sovereignty (CS), and independence of irrelevant alternatives (HA) and observe that every social welfare function is rational. Additionally I define strict social welfare functions as the analogue of strict voting procedures. Next I prove that a procedure exists for constructing a strict strategy-proof voting procedure from every strict social welfare function satisfying NNR, CS, and IIA. I then show that a procedure exists for constructing a strict social welfare function satisfying NNR, CS, and IIA from every strict strategy-proof voting procedure. This last result is based on an intermediate result which Gibbard [7] obtained in his proof of Theorem 1. Together these results imply the correspondence theorem: a one-to-one correspondence between strict strategy-proof voting procedures and strict social welfare functions satisfying NNR, CS, and IIA can be constructed. Section 6 contains the theorem's generalization to non-strict voting procedures and social welfare functions.
Arrow [l] defines a social welfare function for a committee with n members considering m alternatives to be a singlevalued mapping u"~ whose domain is nmn and whose range is rrrn or some nonempty subset of rm . Thus u%"(B) = A where B = (B, ,..., B,) E nrnR and A ET,. The weak order A is called the social ordering. A social welfare function is identical to a voting procedure except that its image is a weak order on S, instead of a single element of S, . Given a ballot set B and a subset T C S, , Arrow defines the social choice over the set T to be Y&""(B)], i.e., the social choice is that element of T which the social ordering ranks highest. Finally, let a committee that is using a social welfare function IP be described by the triplet (1, , S,,, , ZP~), Arrow's choice of definitions for social welfare function and social choice guarantees that every social welfare function satisfies the condition of rationality. Let vu(B) be a social choice function: for every B E rmn and UC S, , the function's image is a subset of U. The function q is rational if for each B E rrm" there exists a weak order A E rTT, such that, for all UC S, , q"(B) = Y&4). Th us, trivially, every social welfare function unm gives rise to rational social choices Y&""(B)
= A]. In addition to the implicit requirement of rationality, Arrow posits four conditions which, he argues, any ideal social welfare function should satisfy. Citizens' Sovereignty (CS). Let A = u""(B). For every x, y E S,,, there exists a ballot set B E n," such that xAy.
Nonnegative Response (NNR).
For some x E S, let W = S, -(x) and let C, D ET," be any two ballot sets which have the properties that (a) for all i E I, , B,(CJ = 6&D,), (b) for all i E 1, and all y E W, xD,y if xCiy, and (c) for all i E I,, and all y E W, xDiy if xciy. Let u""(C) = A, and u""(D) = A, . If, for any z E W, x&z, then xA,z.
In less formal language Condition NNR requires that if the only change in ballot set D is that on some individual ballots within ballot set D alternative x has been moved up relative to some other alternatives, then within the committee's final social ordering Al, alternative x cannot have moved down in relation to its position within the original social ordering A, .
The reasonableness of the ND, CS, and NNR conditions is obvious. Fishburn [5] and Plott [12] contain excellent discussion of the reasonableness of rationality and IIA. Conditions CS, NNR, and IIA, as Arrow [l, pp. 971 has noted, imply the condition of Pareto optimality.
Pareto Optimality (PO).
Let A = zF(B). If any B ETT,~ has the property that &y for all i E 1, and some x, y E S, , then xjTy.
Observe that if a social welfare function satisfiesP0, then it also satisfies CS.
I define a strict social we&e function analogously to a strict voting procedure. The domain of a strict social welfare function u"" is limited to elements of pm", i.e., only B E pnzn are admissable as ballot sets. Similarly, the range of a strict social welfare function is limited; it may be either pm or any of its nonempty subsets.
With these preliminaries complete, I can describe the procedure by which a strategy-proof voting procedure can be constructed from any social welfare function satisfying CS, NNR, and IIA. Let umrn be a social welfare function with the property that, for all B E rrmn, the image of YJu"~(B)] is always a single element of S, . Construct the voting procedure unln by defining, for all B E TV", uflnz(B) = ?Ps[unm(B)]. Call any vnm so constructed the voting procedure derived from ~4"". Clearly the vnna derived from a unm is unique. Lemma 7 states that a sufficient condition for a vnm which is derived from a strict unm to be strategy-proof is that ~nm satisfy CS, NNR, and IIA. LEMMA 7. Consider a strict committee (I,, S, , unm) where n > 2 and m > 3. If the strict social welfare function satisjies CS, NNR, and IIA, then the strict voting procedure vnn derived,from unm is strategy-proof and has range T, = S,,, .
Proof. Since unm satisfies CS, NNR, and IIA, it also satisfies PO. Observe that if u"" satisfies PO, then the derived vnn has a range identical to S, because unm has domain pm" and v""(B) = Y/,[u""(B)] for all B E pma. This leaves the question of the strategy-proofness of v'l".
Suppose a strict unm satisfies CS, NNR, and IIA, and that its derived vnm is not strategy-proof. Since v a?n is not strategy-proof a ballot set (4 ,..., Bi 2..., Bn) E pm" exists at which ~7~~ is manipulable: Consider the first case where YBi'x. Let U = S, -(x). Construct a new ballot Bi* = [x O,(B,')], i.e., xB,*z for all z E iJ and, for all w, z E U, wB,*z if and only if w&'z. Thus, on the ballot Bi* alternative x is topranked and the relative positions of other alternatives is unchanged. This is the type of shift that condition NNR describes. Let unm(B1 ,..., Bi*,..., B,) = A*. Nonnegative response (NNR) then implies that xA*z for all z E U. This is because YJA') = x; consequently, Ys(A*) = x also. Let X = (x, y). Notice Bi* is constructed SO that 8,(Bi*) = B,(Bi), i.e., both xB,*y and x&y. If we apply IIA, the implication is that Yx(A*) = Y,(A). This, however, contradicts the assumption that Yx(A*) = Y,(A*) = x and Yx(A) = Y/,(A) = y. Therefore, if YBi'X, then vnnL must be strategyproof.
Consider the second case where x&'y. Observe that O,(BJ = O,(B,') where X = (x, y). Condition IIA implies that necessarily Y/,(A') = 'u,(A). This, however, contradicts the assumption that Yx(A) = Y/,(A) = y and Yx(A') = Y&A') = x. Therefore, if XBi'y, then vn* must be strategyproof. 1
Consistent with the definition of a derived voting procedure, I define unm to be the social welfare function that underlies the voting procedure vnm if and only if, for all B ET,", Ys[unn(B)] = v%"(B) where S = S,,, . Clearly, many social welfare functions underlie every voting procedure vnm. My interest here, however, is to find for each strategy-proof voting procedure vnm an underlying social welfare function unm that satisfies CS, NNR, and IIA. Such a unna can be constructed for any strict strategyproof vnm by following a procedure Gibbard [7] has devised.
Pick an arbitrary strong order Q E pm . Define d,, , where x, y E S,,, and x # y, to be a function with domain and range pm Since a P is defined for each ballot set (B, ,..., B,) E pm", a function E.L can be defined that associates the appropriate P with each B E pm%, Gibbard [7] , in his proof of this paper's Theorem 1, showed that if a strict voting procedure vnm is strategy-proof, then the binary relation P associated with each B E pm* is a strong order, i.e. P E pm . This means that the function p is a strict social welfare function. Gibbard then went on to show that p has two properties in such cases: it underlies vnna and it satisfies PO and IIA.S It also satisfies CS because PO implies CS.
Three facts are important to note concerning Gibbard's result. First, it considers only strict voting procedures whose ranges T, are identical to the alternative set S, . Nevertheless, this restriction is not limiting because, as was shown in section three's proof of Theorem 1, any strict strategyproof vnna for which T, c S, , p > 3, can be rewritten as a strict strategyproof voting procedure vnp defined over the reduced alternative set S, = TD . Gibbard's result then applies to v"p: underlying it is a strict social welfare function unp which satisfies PO and IIA.
The second fact to note is that Gibbard's result does not establish the uniqueness of the unm that underlies each strict strategy-proof vnm. This, however, is easy to prove. Suppose that two strict social welfare functions TV and p' both underlie v"~, both satisfy PO and IIA, and, for some CEP?nnZ,p (C) # p'(C). Observe that, for all B E pm*, u""(B) = Y&(B)] = Y&'(B)] because p and t.~' are both assumed to underlie vnm. Therefore, an x, y E S, exist such that xjJy and yA'x where p(C) = A and p'(C) = A'. Let, for all i E 1, , Ci* = d,,(C). Also let A* = p(C*) and A'* = p'(C*). By IIA, xA*y and yA'*x. By PO, xA*z, yA*z, xA'*z, yA'*z for all * This particular result is the heart of Gibbard's proof of this paper's Theorem 1. His method is to first show that underlying every strategy-proof unm is a u-satisfying PO and IIA. Arrow's general possibility theorem [l] then implies that unm is dictatorial. Finally, he proves that a dictatorial u"'" underlying unm implies that u"" is dictatorial. This theorem's significance stems from the fact that the strategy-proofness condition corresponds to Arrow's rationality, CS, NNR, and IIA conditions independently of the fact that each set of conditions by itself implies dictatoriality. Thus, construction of a social welfare function satisfying Arrow's conditions is equivalent to constructing a strategy-proof voting procedure, Theorem 2 creates a strong new justification for Arrow's choice of rationality, CS, NNR, and IIA as conditions which an ideal social welfare function should satisfy, The conditions of rationality and IIA which have caused so much controversy are now shown to be part and parcel of the very practical criterion of strategy-proofness. For instance, this theorem shows that rationality is more than an attractive intellectural criterion. If a social welfare function violates rationality, then the voting procedure derived from it violates strategy-proofness.
ARROW'S GENERAL POSSIBILITY THEOREM
If a strict social welfare satisfies CS, NNR, and IIA, then Lemma 7 states that the strict voting procedure derived from it is strategy-proof. According to Theorem 1 this derived voting procedure must be dictatorial. In this section I show that dictatoriality of the derived voting procedure implies dictatoriafity of the original social welfare function. This establishes for the case of strict social welfare functions a new proof of Arrow's general possibility theorem [l] . In Section 6 I extend this proof to the general case of social welfare functions. Proof. Suppose a strict unm exists which is not dictatorial, but which satisfies CS, NNR, and IIA. By Lemma 7, let vnm be the strategy-proof strict voting procedure derived from zPm. By the constructive proof of Theorem 2, vnm is dictatorial. Hence, for all BE pm", !?'s[unm(B)] = v%"(B) = fsi(B) for some i E I, and where S = S, . Recall, however, that unm is not dictatorial. This implies that a ballot set B E pm" exists such that, for some x, y E S, , x&y and yAx where u""(B) = A.
Rewrite ballot set B as B* where, for all .j E Z,, , Bj* = [tY,(BJ I~,(BJ], U = (x, y), and W = S, -(x, y), i.e. Bj* is identical to Bj except that alternatives x and y are moved to the top. Consequently fsi(B*) = x because x&y implies x&*y. Let A* = unm(B*). By IIA, yA*x. By PO, either Y&4*) = x or Y&4*) = y. The former is impossible because yd*x. Therefore, Y~[u"~(B*)] = u%,(B*) = y. This, however, contradicts the fact that individual i is a dictator for vnm because vmm(B*) = f,'(B*) = x. Therefore unm cannot be nondictatorial. 1
GENERALIZATIONS TO WEAK ORDERS
In this final section I generalize Theorems 1, 2, and 3 by making indifference admissable on individuals' ballots and preferences. The key step in my proofs of these generalization is to show that strategy-proof voting procedures and social welfare functions satisfying CS, NNR, and IIA AND ARROW' S CONDITIONS 209 may be decomposed into a tie-breaking function and, respectively, a strict voting procedure or strict social welfare function. Define a tie-breaking function to be a single-valued function 01 with domain rrmn, range pmn, and property that if ar(B) = C for some B E vmn and C E pmn, then, for all x, y E S, , and all i E I, , x&y implies xCi y and y&x implies yCix. If, for some x, y E S, and some Bi ES-, , xBi y and yBjx then either xCiy or yC,x depending on the tie-breaking function's structure. 
Bi E rr3 such that xBiy, yBix, X&Z, and y&z. The functions 01~ and yi break the indifference between x and y in opposite directions: ai(x M yz) = (y x z) and y& w y z) = (x y z). Function yi on Table III is admissible as a component of a regular tie-breaking function because the strong ordering Qi = (x y z) describes how yi breaks indifference between the elements of S, . Function 01~ , however, is not admissible as a component of a regular tie-breaking function because, for instance, it breaks indifference between y and z in both directions: q(x y m z) = (x z y) and c+( y w zx) = (yzx). Based on this definition of regular tie-breaking functions, I define a regular voting procedure to be any voting procedure I.? which can be written such that, for all B E z-~",
where v"" is a strict voting procedure and y is a regular tie-breaking function. Similarly, I define a regular social we&e function to be any social welfare function unnz whose range is contained in pm and which can be written such that, for all B E TV", un"W = P'%(B)1 (34) where prim. is a strict social welfare function and y is a regular tie-breaking function. Notice that the range of a regular social welfare function is limited to pm instead of 7r, . With these definitions in hand I shall in the remainder of this section state and prove Theorems l', 2', and 3'. These theorems generalize Theorems 1, 2, and 3 from strict to nonstrict committees. In their proofs I shall use the results from three additional lemmas that I also state and prove in this section. These lemmas, which have interest in their own right, show how strategy-proof voting procedures and social welfare functions satisfying CS, NNR, and IIA can be decomposed into tie-breaking functions and, respectively, strict strategy-proof voting procedures and strict social welfare functions satisfying PO and IIA. where Pm is a strict strategy-proof voting procedure and y is a regular tie-breaking function, then vnm is strategy-proof.
If vnm is strategy proof, then there exists a strict strategy-proof voting procedure vnm and tie-breaking function 01 such that, for all B E rrm", P"(B) = V@(B)]. 
i.e., vnm is manipulable at (C, ,..., Cj ,..., C,). Consequently, our assumption that vnm is strategy-proof is contradicted. Consider the lemma's second proposition now. I start with a strategyproof vnm and must show that there exists a strict strategy-proof vnm and tie-breaking function CL such that, for all BETTOR, Pm(B) = vnm[a(B)]. First, I define the strict voting procedure vlzm such that vnm(Bl ,..., B,J = vnm(B1 ,..., B,) for all BE pm". This definition guarantees the strategyproofness of vnm because vnm, by virtue of its strategy-proofness over its domain rr,", cannot be manipulated at any point in the domain pm" of vnna.
To complete the proof I must construct tie-breaking functions a = (011 )...) an). An iterative process of first finding an appropriate (pi , then an appropriate 01~ , and so on through 01, works. Consider an arbitrary ballot set B E rrnzn and suppose I have found, for some j E I, , appropriate oli for all i < j, i.e., vnm(Bl ,..., Bj ,..., B,) = vnm(+(B),..., aiwl(B), Bj ,..., B,) = x.
Further suppose I cannot find an appropriate tie-breaker oli, i.e., for every clj
where y # X. Pick any aj such that (38) is true. Let Ci = ai for all i < j. The assumption that v lz* is strategy-proof implies two conditions: 
hIARK ALLEN SATTERTHWAITE These may be rewritten, based on (37) and (38), as wxCjy and -yBjx. Since Cj = oli(B), x&y would imply XC? y. Nevertheless, -XC? y; therefore -x&y. Together -x&y and -y&x indicate indifference between x and y on ballot Bj . Moreover, since Cj E pm , wxCjy implies yC+. In summary, strategy-proofness of vnm implies xB, y, yBjx, and yzi$x.
The conclusion is clear: if, for a strategy-proof vnm, breaking the tie on ballot Bi changes the committee's choice from x to y, then necessarily the ballot Bj ranks x and y indifferently and the tie-breaker 01~ moves y above x. This conclusion, however, contradicts the assumption that no appropriate 01~ exists. Let o+' break the tie between x and y in favor of x instead of in favor of y. The conclusion stated above implies that no change in the committee's choice can result because olj' breaks the indifference in favor of the committee's original choice. Therefore aj' is an appropriate (Ye . Since my original choices of both j and B = (B1 ,..., B,) were arbitrary, I can find an appropriate aj(B) for each j E 1, and each B E 7~,,". 1 lo Suppose p $ 'Zs . This implies that unm does not satisfy IIA, NNR, and CS over the domain pm". Therefore, un+" does not satisfy IIA and NNR over the domain n,". Moreover, since u""(B) = &J(B)] for all B E r++O, if p does not satisfy CS over p,,,", then u,,," does not satisfy CS over the domain q,, *. Therefore, if u E 9, , then p E +Ys .
Therefore a unln E aR underlies every v"" E 9'jR . Moreover, the Pm E GPR underlying each vBm E ryk is unique. This is shown by making minor changes in the uniqueness proof contained in Section 4. Let u* be any element 4!ZR and let v* E VR be the unique voting procedure derived from it. Since YJu*(B)] = v*(B), U* is the unique element of 9XR which underlies v*. But every vnm E VR has its unique unm E GVK underlying it. Thus, the correspondence h exists and is one-to-one. 1 LEMMA 11. Consider a committee (I,, , S,,, , unlra) where n 3 2, m > 3, and unm is a social welfare function. Let y be an arbitrary regular tiebreaking function and dejne the social weIfare function prim such that, for all BE i-rr,", pn"(B) = y[un"(B)].
If unm satisfies CS, NNR, and IIA, then pn* has range contained in pm and satisfies CS, NNR, and IIA.
Proof. Assume that Pm satisfies CS, NNR, and IIA. Equation (44) and the definition of y directly imply that the range of parn is contained in pm . They also imply that pn" satisfies CS. Suppose CL"* violates IIA: a B E rrmn, C E rrmn, and U C S,,, therefore exist such that [ # YUbm(C)]. Suppose parn violates NNR: a B = (B1 ,..., Bi ,..., BJ E vmn, a Bi' G rrm , Bi f Bi', and a x, y E S,,, exist such that yBdx, xB;y xAy, and yxx where A = unn(B1 )..., Bi )...) B,) = prim(B) and A' = pnm(B1 ,..., Bi' ,..., B,) = pnm(BI). In addition Bi and Bi' have the property that e,(BJ = e,(B,') where U = S, -(x). Let u"~(B) = A* and unlla(B') = A*'. Since A = y(A*) and A' = y(A*'), consistency with the definition of y implies that either Gi*y and yA*'x or xA*y and yA*'x. Nevertheless, Z.P satisfies NNR. Application of NNR to u""(B) and u""(B') implies that if xA*y, then xA*'y and if xJ*y, then xA*'y. Thus, for pnrn to violate NNR contradicts the assumption that unln satisfies NNR. B THEOREM 3'. (Arrow) . Consider a committee (I,, S, , unm) where n > 2 and m > 3. The social welfare function unm satisfies CS, NNR, and IIA only tfit is dictatorial.
Proof. Assume that unm satisfies CS, NNR, and IIA. Lemmas 10 and 11 imply that an arbitrary regular tie-breaking function y, a strict social welfare function ZL satisfying CS, NNR, and IIA, and a tie-breaking function 01 exists such that rCu""(Wl = PW)I (45) for all B E rrmn. Pick U = (x, y). Set Q E pm , the tie-breaking order for y, such that xQy. Theorem 3 states that because p satisfies CS, NNR, and IIA it is dictatorial. Assume that individual i is the dictator of p.
Let y' be a regular tie-breaking function with tie-breaking order Q' E pm such that yQ'x. As above, we can write 45) individual i is the dictator for p, but not for unm. Therefore, a C E rrmn exists such that for some x, y ES, , yC,x and ~ydx where A = u""(C). Since (I is dictatorial, yA*x where A* = p[a(C)]. Without loss of generality assume that the x and y of this paragraph are identical to the x and y of the preceding two paragraphs.ll Recall that Q, the tie-breaking order for y, has the property that xQy. Let A' = y(A) = @""(C)l.
Therefore, -yAx implies that xjI'y. But A' = y[u""(C)] = p[a(C)] = A* and, from above, yA*x. This contradicts the result that xA'y. Therefore individual i must be the dictator of unm. 1
